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EXPORT AND IMPORT CONTROLS ON MOVEMENT
OF THE CULTURAL HERITAGE: PROBLEMS
AT THE NATIONAL LEVEL
P.J. O'Keefe*

Prof 0 'Keefe examined the implications, for export and import
controls, of national court decisions.
I.
A.

THE CASELA W

KING OF ITALY V. MARQUIS COSIMO DE MEDICI TORNAQUINCI1

This was an action in England in 1918 to prevent the auctioneers, "Christie's," from selling the "Medici papers." These were
documents, dating from the eleventh to the eighteenth century, that
had been collected by the Medici family. They included letters to
and from Lorenzo the Magnificient, as well as others belonging to
the State of Florence. About half of the 800 lots were state papers.
The other half were of great historical interest; their export was
forbidden, and the Italian State had a right of preemption. The judge
granted an injunction, pending the trial of the action, to prevent
the sale of the state papers, but not of the others. The other papers
were subsequently sold at auction, despite the judge's warning that
this might expose the vendors and the purchasers to an action for
damages. It appears that the decision, which was interlocutory only,
was arrived at without detailed argument.

B. ATTORNEY-GENERAL OF NEW ZEALAND V. 0RTIZ 2
This case concerns five carved wooden panels which at one time
probably formed the end wall of a Maori pataka, or raised
store-house. 3 The event which led to the case was a television news
* Senior Lecturer in Law, University of Sydney; Visiting Fulbright Senior Scholar,
Syracuse University, 1982-83.
1. [1918] 34 T.L.R. 623 (Ch.).
2. [1982] 1Q.B.349, rev'd, [1982] 3 W.L.R. 570 (C.A.), appeal dismissed, [1983] 2 W.L.R.
809 (H.L.). The factual background to the case is set out in Cater, The Taranaki Panels-A
Case-Study in the Recovery of Cultural Heritage, 34 MUSEUM 256 (1982). The description above
is based on this article.
3. The importance of the panels is evident in the following:
This carved wall undoubtedly represents the sihgle most exciting unit of the nowextinct Taranaki carving style, a local style considered by many to be one of the
most interesting and certainly the most distinctive of the dozen or so different
classic Maori regional styles. It is a true masterpiece of Maori art.
Yaldwyn, The Taranaki Panels-Their Significance and Mana, 34 MUSEUM 259 (1982).
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broadcast, in early June 1978, seen in Taranaki, New Zealand. It
concerned a forthcoming auction at Sotheby Parke Bernet & Co.,
London, of items from the collection of George Ortiz, an Italian resident in Switzerland. Lot No. 150, a series of five carved wooden
panels, was recognized by a resident of Taranaki, Mr. Meads, as
identical to some he had seen six years earlier at the home of a
nearby resident. Some time later, at a social event, Meads mentioned this to Mr. Lambert, the Director of the Taranaki Museum.
Lambert contacted the Chairman of the New Zealand National Committee for the International Council of Museums (ICOM), who in
turn informed the Department of Internal Affairs. Photographs in
the auction catalogue convinced the authorities that the panels had
been in Taranaki in about 1972. No export permit had been issued
for them to leave the country, as required by the then extant New
Zealand legislation, the Historic Articles Act 1962. 4
The person alleged to have been in possession of the .panels,
a Maori tribesman named Manukonga, was interviewed by the
police. He freely admitted finding the panels in a swamp in 1972.
They had been buried there by the Taranaki tribe in the 1820's when
under attack from a neighboring tribe. Manukonga sold the panels
to an English dealer in primitive works of arts, Lance Entwhistle,
for $6,000. Entwhistle took the panels to Auckland and then illegally
exported them to New York. There he telephoned Ortiz in
Switzerland. Ortiz came to New York and, on April 23, 1973, purchased them for $65,000. Their value at the time of auction, June
1978, was said to be £ 300,000. 4a
The New Zealand government sought an interim injunction to
prevent the sale from taking place pending proceedings to determine the question of ownership. Sotheby's and Ortiz, however,
agreed to remove the panels from the auction. In New Zealand,
Cabinet, i.e., the collective body of government ministers, on July
10, 1973 agreed:
that all necessary legal steps should be taken "to secure the return
of the five panels ... and if necessary, to apply for a Court Order
to the effect that the artifact is the property of the Crown in New
Zealand, provided that such steps shall not include negotiations
with a view to a financial settlement without further authority from
Cabinet." 5

Throughout 1978 and 1979, evidence was collected, and
4. [1962] 1 N.Z. Stat. 405. This was later replaced by the Antiquities Act, [1975] 1
N.Z. Stat. 337.
4a. Approximately U.S. $550,000.
5. Cater, supra note 2, at 257.
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maneuvering took place concerning the way the litigation should
proceed. The New Zealand legal advisors wished the matter to be
considered in a single main trial. Ortiz and Entwhistle, as first and
third defendants, sought trial on two preliminary issues: 1) whether
the New Zealand government had become the owner and was thus
entitled to possession of the panels, and 2) whether the New Zealand
legislation that provided for this was enforceable in England. The
point went to the Court of Appeal which settled it in favor of the
defendants. Concerning the collection of evidence, Dr. Prott and
I were called on to assess whether the law of New Zealand, which
seeks to protect its articles of historic importance, is very usual. 6
The matter came to trial in June 1981 and on July l, Judge
Staughton handed down his judgment. He found that, under the
Historic Articles Act 1962, such articles, if exported without a
license, were automatically forfeited to the Crown, i.e., the
government. 7 Further, he found that the legislation was enforceable
in England. 8
The defendants appealed to the Court of Appeals which reversed the decision of Staughton. 9 That court held that forfeiture
did not take place automatically but only upon seizure by the Crown.
The Crown was neither the owner, nor entitled to possession of
the panels. On the second preliminary point two of the judges,
Ackner and O'Connor, classified the New Zealand legislation as
penal and therefore not enforceable in England. Lord Denning,
Master of the Rolls, considered the legislation as falling "into the
category of 'public laws' which will not be enforced ... because
it is an act done in the exercise of sovereign authority which will
not be enforced outside its [the legislating state's] own territory." 10
The New Zealand government appealed to the House of Lords
6. The department approached Dr. Lyndall [sic] V. Prott and P.J. O'Keefe of
the University of Sydney, Australia, for an assessment of this matter. Both had
considerable experience in the field of laws relating to the protection of cultural
property. By December 1980 they provided a statement covering aspects of the
relevant legislation of no fewer than 119 different jurisdictions. Their statement
showed that New Zealand's law fell within a group of seventy-one jurisdictions
which had some provision for forfeiture of [sic] confiscation of cultural heritage
items which were being illegally exported.
Id. at 258.
7. [1982] 1 Q.B. at 362.
8. Id. at 371-72.
9. [1982] 3 W.L.R. 570 (C.A.).
10. Id. at 585.
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which considered the matter on March 7, 8, and 9, 1983. These three
days were fully occupied with argument on the first preliminary
point: the issue of automatic forfeiture. The House then adjourned
to consider this issue and in April ruled in favor of the respondents,
Ortiz and Entwhistle. 11

C. UNITED STATES V. HOLLINSHEAD 12
This case concerned a U.S. dealer in pre-Columbian artifacts
who conspired with another person to procure such objects in Central America. One of them was a rare stele, known as Machaquila
Stele 2, taken from a Mayan ruin in the Guatemalan jungle, cut into
pieces, labeled "personal effects" and dispatched to Hollinshead in
the United States. According to Guatemalan law, such a stele was
the property of the Guatemalan Republic and could not be removed without the permission of the government. Hollinshead was convicted under the U.S. National Stolen Property Act. 13
D.

UNITED STATES V. MCCLAIN 14

One of the defendants in this case, Rodriquez, arrived in San
Antonio, Texas with a truckload of Mexican pre-Columbian art. He
was unwise enough to offer it to the Mexican Cultural Institute in
that city, which happened to be run by the Mexican government.
Under a 1972 Mexican statute, the Federal Law on Archaeological,
Artistic a.nd Historic Monuments and Zones, 15 all pre-Columbian
antiquities are the property of the state. The Mexican Cultural Institute contacted the F .B.I., and the defendants were prosecuted
and convicted under the U.S. National Stolen Property Act. 16 The
conviction was, however, reversed on appeal on the ground that
the question whether these artifacts could have been owned
privately 11 should have been left to the jury to decide. 18 The case
was remanded for further proceedings.
At the second trial, testimony was admitted concerning the
relevant Mexican law which was alleged to vest ownership of all
11. (1983] 2 W.L.R. 809 (H.L.).
12. 495 F.2d 1154 (9th Cir. 1974).
13. 18 u.s.c. § 2314 (1982).
14. 545 F.2d 988 (5th Cir. 1977), affd in part, rev'd in part, 593 F.2d 658 (5th Cir. 1979).
15. 312 D.O. 16 (1972).
16. 18 u.s.c. § 2314.
17. In other words, the jury should have decided whether or not the objects had come
legally into the hands of private persons before the date of the Mexican Act which made
these types of objects subject to state ownership.
18. 545 F.2d at 1003.
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pre-Columbian artifacts in the Mexican government since 1897. The
trial judge left to the jury the question of whether and when Mexico validly enacted national ownership of the artifacts involved. The
defendants were once again convicted and again appealed. The
appeal1 9 was allowed on the ground that:
the most likely construction of Mexican law upon the evidence at
trial is that Mexico declared itself owner of all artifacts at least
as early as 1897. And under this view of Mexican law, we believe
the defendants may have suffered the prejudice of being convicted
pursuant to laws that were too vague to be a predicate for criminal
liability under our jurisprudential standards. 20

E. DECISION OF THE GERMAN FEDERAL COURT OF CIVIL
CLAIMS OF 22 JUNE 1972 IN S.B. & Co. V. G.H. 21

In this case, a Nigerian company had entered into an insurance
contract with a German company to cover the transport by sea of
three cases of African masks and statutes from Port Harcourt,
Nigeria to Hamburg. The shipment was in violation of Nigerian law
on the export of cultural objects. Six bronze statutes were lost, and
the plaintiff was seeking damages under the insurance contract.
German law, however, will not enforce a contract contrary to public
policy. 22 The court considered the UNESCO Convention on the
Means of Prohibiting and Preventing the Import, Export and
Transfer of Ownership of Cultural Property of 197023 and found that
this represented the emerging international public policy on the
issue. Therefore, even though the Federal Republic of Germany was
not a party to the Convention, the German court held that the contract was unenforceable in Germany, since, it said, "[t ]he export
of cultural property contrary to a prohibition of the country of origin
for that reason merits, in the interest of maintaining proper standards for the international trade in cultural objects, no protection
from the civil law ...." 24
19. 593 F.2d 658 (5th Cir. 1979). For a discussion of these cases in the context of the
law of the United States, see Upton, Art Theft: National Stolen Property Act Applied to Nationalized Mexican Pre-Columbian Artifacts, 10 N.Y.U .J . INT'L L. & POL. 569 (1978); Walters,
Art Law, Protection of Foreign Antiquities Using Domestic Statutes: United States v. McClain,
545 F.2d 988 (5th Cir. 1977}, 10 CONN. L . REV. 727 (1978).
20. 593 F.2d at 670.
21. Urteile v. 22 Juni 1972 i. S. Allg. Vers. G.H. w. E.K., 59 BGHZ 83 (Bundesgerichtshof
1972).
22. Id. at 84-85.
23. Id. at 85-86.
24. "Die Ausfuhr von Kulturgut entgegen einem Verbot des Ursprungslandes verdient
daher im Interesse der Wahrung der Anstandigkeit im internationalen Verkehr mit
Kunstgegenstanden keinen biirgerlich-rechtlichen Schutz ...." Id. at 86.
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II. EXPORT CONTROLS
A.

VOLUME OF LITIGATION

The vast majority of jurisdictions have legislation forbidding
the export of items of cultural heritage. In many instances, this
dates back to the beginning of the twentieth century and in some
cases it applied much earlier. Yet the cases described above represent the most significant litigation on breach of that prohibition.
Surely this relative lack of litigation does not mean that there has
been little breach of the law. The illicit trade in antiquities is
notorious. Rather, there would appear to be three reasons for this
relative lack of legal action. First, until recently, administrators
were not very concerned with enforcing these laws. It was often
said that crimes against the cultural heritage were "victimless
crimes": that nobody was hurt by illegal excavation or unauthorized
export. This attitude has now changed and it is seen that society
as a whole is a victim of the loss caused by such action: loss of contextual information, associated destructions and damage caused to
that heritage. With this change of attitude has come a greater desire
and willingness to act to enforce such laws. Second, the cost involved
in taking legal action in a foreign jurisdiction is so high as to
dissuade most governments from attempting it. Such costs include
not only foes to foreign lawyers, but also the time of senior officials
in preparing the case. The possibility of losing the case and an
adverse award of costs must also be considered. Third, particularly when pursuing archaeological material, there are significant problems in positively identifying the material. For example, in United
States v. McClain, 25 it was fatal to the government's case that it could
not be proven when the artifacts were exported from Mexico. 26
25. 545 F .2d 988.
26. The court stated:
In order to say whether any of the pre-Columbian movable artifacts were "stolen,"
it is necessary to know first when that artifact was exported from Mexico. If the
exportation occurred after the effective date of the 1972 law, the artifact may have
been stolen- but only if it were not legitimately in the seller's hands as a result
of prior law .... If the exportation occurred before 1972, but after the effective
date of the 1934 law, it would be necessary to show that the artifact was found
on or in an immovable archaeological monument. If the exportation occurred before
the effective date of the 1934 law, it could not have been owned by the Mexican
government, and illegal exportation would not, therefore, subject the receiver of
the article to the strictures of the National Stolen Property Act. Because the jury
was not told that it had to determine when the pre-Columbian artifacts had been
exported from Mexico and to apply the applicable Mexican law to that exportation, convictions of all the appellants must be reversed.
Id. at 1003.
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On the other hand, Machaquila Stele 2, in United States v.
Hollinshead, 21 could be conclusively proven to have been in
Guatemala after the date of the relevant legislation. Similarly, the
panels in Ortiz 28 had been photographed by Manukonga before he
sold them to Entwhistle. These photographs were produced for the
police and clearly matched the panels put up for auction in London. Many of the known facts were then admitted by the defendants in that case, and they defended the action against them on
legal grounds.
B. EFFECT OF PROHIBITIONS

The above cases illustrate the range of practical problems involved in discussing movement of cultural heritage. The items
whose export is prohibited are not the same for all jurisdictions,
and in many cases, cover what are called "antiquities," which we
might say in broad terms refers to archaeological and ethnographic
material. There is not the space nor is this the place to examine
whether it is possible or desirable to make a distinction between
such material and fine art objects for the purpose of export control. Archaeological material in particular is subject to strict controls on its excavation in many jurisdictions. In most it is an offense to excavate such material without a permit. Many movements
thus involve two illegal activities: excavation and export.
Besides the question of what, precisely, is covered by the export prohibition, a further difficulty arises from the penalty imposed
for illegal export. In our study for the New Zealand government,
Dr. Prott and I found that, out of 124 jurisdictions, seventy-four
provided for either forfeiture of the material to the state, or its
confiscation. Of the remaining fifty jurisdictions, a number claimed ownership of all undiscovered antiquities and thought it unnecessary to also provide for forfeiture or confiscation; while others,
such as the Marxist-Leninist legal systems, have wide powers to
appropriate property, and these are not restricted to the cultural
heritage. But the problem does not end there. Even though the law
may provide for forfeiture, confiscation, or seizure, when does this
take place? We referred briefly to this issue in our study, Existing
Legislative Protection of the Cultural and Natural Heritage of the
Pacific Region:
Frequently the legislation permits the government or administration to seize the relic, though there are considerable variations in
27. 495 F.2d 1154.
28. [1982] 1 Q.B. 349, rev'd, [1982] 3 W.L.R. 570 (C.A.), appeal dismissed, [1983] 2 W.L.R.
809 (H.L.).
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how it is done. In some laws confiscation appears to occur
automatically as an act of law on commission of the offence. For
example, in the law of Western Samoa the relic sh.all be forfeited
and vested in the Government. In New Caledonia, Resolution No.
226 of 7 July 1960 is to the effect that objects and fragments of
objects exported illicitly which are discovered will be confiscated.
The Antiquities Act of 1975 of New Zealand states that export or
attempted export of an antiquity in breach of the Act results in
forfeiture to the Crown; the provisions of the Customs Act 1966
on forfeiture apply. On the other hand, other legislation appears
to require some judicial or administrative act before forfeiture can
occur. The Joint Regulation of Vanuatu states that the Court having jurisdiction may order confiscation of any object involved in
an offense against the Regulation. In Fiji, if a permit to export
is not produced an "object of archaeological or palaeontological interest may be confiscated and disposed of as the Minister may
direct" (s.19(4)). What is the effect on title to the relic of confiscation or forfeiture? This is a matter for the law of the jurisdiction
but attention needs to be paid to the question of the effect of that
law in a foreign jurisdiction. For example, if an item is smuggled
out of the jurisdiction can it be recovered through action in the
courts of a foreign country where it is found? What attention will
the foreign court pay to the prohibition on export without a
license? 29

The answers to the questions posed here depend on a number
of factors. For example, does the state claim ownership of the
antiquity in question under general vesting legislation? Has it
possessed the antiquity? Does the action merely require recognition of the state's title, or does it require the foreign court to enforce that claim? What effect will later transactions have on claims
of title?
C.

CLAIM OF OWNERSHIP

A large number of jurisdictions lay claim to ownership of all
antiquities discovered subsequent to a specified date. Such claims
are not restricted to any one political or social system but range
across the spectrum. 30 Other jurisdictions, as was noted above, pro29. L.V. Prott & P.J. O'Keefe, Existing Legislative Protection of the Cultural and
Natural Heritage of the Pacific Region 100-01 (UNESCO 1982).
30. Some examples are: Belize, Brunei, Bulgaria, Costa Rica, Cyprus, Dominican
Republic, Ecuador, Gibraltar, Greece, Haiti, Hong Kong, Hungary, Iceland, Iraq, Israel, Italy,
Kenya, Kuwait, Libya, Malaysia, New Zealand, Romania, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Taiwan, Tanzania, Tunisia, Turkey, Venezuela, and People's Democratic Republic of Yemen.
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vide for forfeiture on export, or attempted export, without a license.
The crucial issue here concerns at what stage the forfeiture takes
place. Does it require actual seizure and reduction to possession
by the authorities? Is it automatic on the occurrence of the illicit
export? The answer to this question is important, in that it will
determine what action the foreign courts will be asked to take.
The first preliminary issue in Ortiz 31 was whether or not the
forfeiture was automatic. 32 The issue as stated by Judge Staughton
was:
whether the words "shall be forfeited" in section 12(2) [of the
Historic Articles Act 1962] have the effect that the ownership of
an article is immediately transferred to Her Majesty by operation
of law, or whether such transfer only takes effect when the article is seized pursuant to provisions of the Customs Acts or is later
condemned pursuant to those Acts. The issue is important because
the carving in this case never was seized pursuant to the Customs
Acts nor condemned; nor can it now be seized or condemned, first
because it is outside New Zealand, and secondly, because, as will
be seen later, there is a time limit of two years after which seizure
cannot take effect from the date of export or attempt to export. 33

Because of the reference to the Customs Act of 1913,34 under which
it was well established that forfeiture was not automatic, the effect
of the provision in the Historic Articles Act of 1962 was debatable.
31. (1982] 1 Q.B. 349, rev'd, [1982] 3 W.L.R. 570 (C.A.), appeal dismissed, [1983] 2 W.L.R.
809 (H.L.).
32. Section 12 of the Historic Articles Act 1962 provided:
Application of Customs Act 1913-(1) Subject to the provisions of this Act, the provisions of the Customs Act 1913 shall apply to any historic article the removal from
New Zealand of which is prohibited by this Act in all respects as if the article were
an article the export of which had been prohibited pursuant to an Order in Council under section 47 of the Customs Act 1913.
(2) An historic article knowingly exported or attempted to be exported in breach
of this Act shall be forfeited to Her Majesty and, subject to the provisions of this
Act, the provisions of the Customs Act 1913 relating to forfeited goods shall apply
to any such article in the same manner as they apply to goods forfeited under the
Customs Act 1913.
(3) Where any historic article is forfeited to Her Majesty pursuant to this section,
it shall be delivered to the Minister and retained in safe custody in accordance
with his directions:
Provided that the Minister may, in his discretion, direct that the article be returned
to the person who was the owner thereof immediately before forfeiture subject
to such conditions (if any) as the Minister may think fit to impose.
[1962] 1 N .Z. Stat. 405, 410.
33. [1982] 1 Q.B. at 355.
34. [1913] 4 N.Z. Stat. 401.
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Judge Staughton concluded that it did provide for automatic
forfeiture. His interpretation was not accepted by the Court of
Appeal. 35 As previously mentioned, the House of Lords also decided that it was not automatic. 36 This episode emphasizes the necessity
for very careful legislative drafting if the intention is to leave ownership of antiquities with individuals but to prohibit export except
under license, and to subje.ct materials exported without license
to automatic forfeiture.
Another aspect that the judgments in the Ortiz case bring out
concern the necessity to establish precisely what is meant by "export." If forfeiture is to take place on "export," when is the antiquity to be regarded as exported? In particular, does the forfeiture
take place within the territory of the jurisdiction or outside it? In
the Court of Appeal, Lord Denning took the view that "forfeiture
would take place and would come into effect as soon as the historic
article was exported, i.e. as soon as it left the territorial jurisdiction of New Zealand. That would be a piece of extra-territorial
legislation which is invalid by international law." 37 But is Lord Denning correct in his view of when "export" takes place?
Judge Staughton, in the court of first instance, had clearly
taken a different view, stating that "[i]t was within the territorial
jurisdiction of the New Zealand legislature at the moment when
the forfeiture took effect, albeit very soon to leave that jurisdiction . . . ." 38 The term "export" was not defined in the Historic
Articles Act 1962 but, in section 69 of the New- Zealand Customs
Act 1966,39 the following appears:
For the purposes of this Act the time of exportation of goods shall
be deemed to be the time at which the exporting ship leaves the
limits of her last port of call in New Zealand, or at which the
exporting aircraft departs from the last Customs airport at which
it landed immediately before proceeding to a country outside New
Zealand. 40

Surely this is a more logical concept of "export" than a very
technical notion of something which occurs as the vessel passes over

35.
36.
37.
38.
39.

[1982)
(1983)
(1982)
(1982)
(1966)
40. Id. at

3 W.L.R. 570 (C.A.).
2 W.L.R. 809 (H.L.).
3 W.L.R. at 580-81.
1 Q.B. at 355.
1 N.Z. Stat. 77.
115.
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the boundary of the territorial sea. Particularly with the development of concepts such as the contiguous zone, the territorial boundary notion is fanciful at best. However, the issue should preferably
be put to rest by careful drafting.
D.

RECOGNITION OR ENFORCEMENT OF LAW ON TITLE

It is well established that courts of one country will not enforce certain laws of another country although they may be
prepared to recognize them. The two questions that emerge are:
what laws will not be enforced, and what is comprehended in the
idea of enforcement? Three fact situations commonly arise: the state
has both ownership and possession before removal from the jurisdiction; the state has ownership but not possession, the state has
neither ownership not possession.
Ownership and Possession
In Princess Paley Olga v. Weisz, 41 there was a Soviet government decree vesting title to the Paley Palace, and its contents, in
St. Petersburg in the Soviet Republic. Weisz purchased some of
the art objects from the government and took them to England.
The Princess subsequently took action to claim them back but failed.
The English court, recognizing the effect of the Soviet decree that
had vested title in that government, declared Weisz, to be the
rightful owner.
In the Court of Appeal in Ortiz, Lord Justice Ackner said:

1.

It is common ground that if the question in this case was one of
recognizing the Historic Articles Act 1962, then it is a law which
the English courts would recognize. Thus, if the carving had been
seized and condemned in New Zealand, thereby being reduced into
the possession of the New Zealand government, then that government would have been entitled to enforce its proprietary title in
this country by reference to the Historic Articles Act. 42

However, the New Zealand government never had possession of
the panels. 43

Ownership But Not Possession
In this situation the state is taking action in the foreign court
to seek return of the material concerned. In King of Italy v. Mar-

2.

41. [1929] 1 K.B. 718 (C.A.).
42. [1982] 3 W.L.R. at 592.
43. In this respect the case is similar to the McClain case where the Mexican government apparently had never had possession of the pre-Columbian artifacts.
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quis Cosimo de Medici Tornaquinci, 44 there was a group of papers
owned by the state but not in its possession. The court granted
the injunction to prevent their sale. In doing this the court, in effect,
enforced the title of the state. On the other hand, it appears that
these papers had, from their creation, been the property of the state.
What of the situation where the material becomes the property of
the state through a legislative act of that state? In seeking return
of the material, is the state seeking enforcement of the title to the
property, or of the law from which that title derives?
English courts will recognize a transfer of title by governmental
act if that act was valid and effective by the law of the situs at
the time it took place, and the property concerned was then situated
within the jurisdiction. This would have been the case in Ortiz if
the forfeiture had been automatic. However, even though the
foreign court might recognize title in the state, will it take further
action to give effect to that recognition? The argument against
taking that further step is that it involves enforcing a foreign law,
and this may be contrary to local public policy.
Thus, counsel for the Attorney General cannot validly contend that
he is suing to enforce a proprietary title and not to enforce a
statute. In order to make good his title in these proceedings, he
has to rely on the Historic Articles Act, since he cannot rely on
any previous possession or other root of title. 45

Does this necessarily follow? Surely it is illogical to recognize title,
yet refuse to enforce it. 46
If the claimant state cannot rely on its title per se, but must
seek to enforce the governmental act through which it acquired that
title, what will be the obstacles it faces? In the common law it is
established that two categories of foreign law will not be enforced:
penal laws, and revenue laws. Some suggest there might be a third
category of "public laws." 47 The last was seized on by Lord Denning in Ortiz. He took the view that the New Zealand legislation involved an exercise of sovereign authority beyond the territory of
New Zealand and could not be enforced. 48 In support of his proposi-

44. (1918) 34 T.L.R. 623 (Ch.l.
45. (1982) 3 W .L.R. at 592.
46. To a certain extent, the case Jabbour v. Custodian of Israeli Absentee Property,
(1954) 1 W.L.R. 139 (Q.B.), supports this view.
47. 1 DICEY & MORRIS ON THE CONFLICTS OF LAWS 89-90 (J. Morris 10th ed. 1980).
48. (1982) 3 W .L.R. at 585.
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tion, Lord Denning quotes Don Alonso v. Cornero,4 9 King of Italy
v. Marquis Cosimo de Medici Tornaquinci, 50 Princess Paley Olga v.
Weisz, 51 and Brokaw v. Seatrain U.K. Ltd. 52 None of these cases was
directly and significantly on point. Ackner would not support Lord
Denning although he expresses no conclusive opinion on the
matter. 53
Ackner, with whom O'Connor agreed, considered the New
Zealand legislation to be penal in nature. In his view, it sought the
vindication of a public right through confiscation. Once again, this
is a harsh characterization of the legislation. The penalization of
the illicit exporter was only a by-product of the basic purpose of
the Act, which was to ensure that important items of the cultural
heritage remained in New Zealand. Many other states which have
adopted similar legislation have often provided for other penalties
for the illegal exporter because confiscation of the property itself
is not seen as a penalty but rather as a means of retaining the
material. 54
It is submitted that the views of Judge Staughton are to be
preferred to the contradictory approaches of the Court of Appeal.
Rejecting all grounds for refusing to enforce the New Zealand
legislation, Judge Staughton adopted a positive stance:
Comity requires that we should respect the national heritage of
other countries, by according both recognition and enforcement
to their laws which affect the title to property while it is within

49. (1611] Hob. 212, 80 E .R. 359.
50. (1918] 34 T.L.R. 623 (Ch.).
51. (1929] 1 K.B. 718 (C.A.).
52. (1971] 2 Q.B. 476 (C.A.).
53. Ackner stated:
In these circumstances it is unnecessary for me to consider the question of whether
there is a third category of foreign laws which our courts do not enforce, namely
public law, and if so, what it comprises. Without reaching any firm conclusion, I
am impressed by the reasoning of the learned judge that there is no vague general
residual category and, that if the test is one of public policy, there is no reason
why English courts should not enforce § 12 of the Historic Articles Act 1962 of
New Zealand.
(1982] 2 W.L.R. at 594.
54. As Judge Staughton stated in the court of the first instance:
But the purpose of the provision for forfeiture in section 12 is not, in my judgment, the vindication of the public justice. Its purpose is to preserve as the property of the people of New Zealand an historic article. It is not, therefore, a penal
provision.
[1982] 1 Q.B. at 366.
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their territory. The hope of reciprocity is an additional ground of
public policy leading to the same conclusion. 55

In the United States, a different approach has been taken
because of the existence of the National Stolen Property Act. 56 This
Act prohibits transportation in foreign or interstate commerce of
any goods known to be stolen which are worth more than $5,000.
As stated by the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals in United States
v. McClain:
Deferring to this legitimate act of another sovereign, we agree with
the earlier panel that it is proper to punish through the National
Stolen Property Act encroachments upon legitimate and clear Mexican ownership, even though the goods may never have been
physically possessed by agents of that nation. 57

Thus, if the state can prove ownership, even under a general vesting
statute, illicit removal of the material to the United States would
be sufficient to bring the National Stolen Property Act into play. 58

Neither Ownership Nor Possession
In a number of jurisdictions the state does not have title to
items of the cultural heritage found in its territory, but does forbid export except under license. If export occurs without a license,
this may expose the smuggler to a fine and/or jail term if he is
caught. It may also mean that the material is liable to forfeiture,
either automatically or in the event of seizure. 59 When forfeiture
only takes place on seizure, the seizure, if export has occurred,
would have to be made by the authorities of a foreign jurisdiction,
e.g., customs officers. These authorities may be willing, and legally able, to cooperate on an administrative level. There may also
be legislation establishing procedures for the return of illegally exported cultural material.
Public international law does not say that "no country can
legislate so as to affect the rights of property when that property
is situated beyond the limits of its own territory ." 60 As Bogdan

3.

55. Id. at 371-72.
56. 18 u.s.c. § 2314 (1982).
57. 593 F.2d at 671.
58. For the scope and application of this Act, see Upton, supra note 19, at 569; Walters,
supra note 19, at 727.
59. The problems of automatic forfeiture have been discussed above in II. B. Effect
of Prohibitions.
60. Ortiz, [1982] 3 W.L.R. at 580 (Lord Denning, M.R.).
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points out, the view that expropriation going beyond the jurisdiction of the expropriator61 is contrary to public international law has
no support in international practice. 62 States generally feel free to
legislate as to property abroad, and there appears to have been
no diplomatic protests indicating that such laws are considered to
violate international law. It is a separate question whether other
states will enforce such laws, but there is nothing in public international law to stop the expropriating state from applying to the
courts of the state where the property is situated for assistance
in enforcing that law. However, the outcome of such a court action
would be highly problematic and, considering the issues of costs,
evidence, etc., may not be a viable option for many states where
the matter in issue is material of the cultural heritage.
The German case, Decision of the German Federal Court of Civil
Claims of 22 June 1972 in S.B. & Co. v. G.H., 63 is relevant here in
that, while the foreign court may not apply the state's export laws,
its refusal to uphold a contract intimately associated with the transaction in breach of those laws may well dissuade persons from
engaging in illicit export. As the court said:
In the community of nations there exist basic convictions as to the
right of every country to protect its cultural heritage and as to
the evils of "practices" ... which impair it and which must be controlled. The export of cultural property contrary to a prohibition
of the country of origin for that reason merits, in the interest of
maintaining proper standards for the international trade in cultural
objects, no protection from the civil law, not even through the insurance of the shipment by which the cultural property is to be
exported from the area subject to the foreign legal system contrary to the prohibition of export designed for its protection. No
insurable interest provides a basis for such a contract. . .. The
former customary and tolerated disregard of the wishes of other
nations to keep possession of their cultural treasures, an attitude
referred to by the appellate court, cannot be used as the standard
of what is compatible with public policy in contemporary opinion. 6'

61. The expropriator attempts to take over assets located beyond his territory.
62. M. BODGAN, EXPROPRIATION IN PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW 15 (1975).
63. 59 BGHZ 83 (Bundesgerichtshof 1972).
64. Translated from:
In der Volkergemeinschaft bestehen hiernach bestimmte grundsatzliche
Uberzeugungen iiber das Recht jedes Landes auf den Schutz seines kulturellen
Erbes and iiber die Verwerflichkeit von Praktiken ... , die es beeintrachtigen
und die bekampft werden miissen. Die Ausfuhr von Kulturgut entgegen einem Ver-
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III. IMPORT CONTROLS
Certain jurisdictions have enacted legislation imposing controls
on the import of material of the cultural heritage which has been
exported contrary to the laws ·of another jurisdiction. Two such
jurisdictions are Canada and Papua New Guinea.
The Canadian Cultural Property Export and Import Act65 states
that "it is illegal to import into Canada any foreign cultural property that has been illegally exported from that reciprocating
State." 66 Section 31 defines "reciprocating State" as meaning "a
foreign State that is a party to a cultural property agreement." 67
Such an agreement is itself defined to mean "an agreement between
Canada and the foreign State ·or an international agreement to which
Canada and the foreign State are both parties, relating to the
prevention of illicit international traffic in cultural property ." 68 It
is said that Canada "had to incorporate these sections on international cooperation and foreign cultural property in the Act in order
to ratify the UNESCO Convention on the Means of Prohibiting and
Preventing the Illicit Import, Export and Transfer of Ownership
of Cultural Property." 69
The National Cultural Property (Preservation) Act 196570 of
Papua New Guinea is not formally predicated on the existence of
an international agreement. Nevertheless, there must be reciprocity.
The responsible Minister must be "satisfied that arrangements have
been made or will be made under the law in force in some place
outside the Territory whereunder any national cultural property
bot des Ursprungslandes verdient daher im Interesse der Wahrung der
Anstandigkeit im internationalen Verkehr mit Kunstgegenstanden keinen
burgerlichrechtlichen Schutz, auch nicht durch die Versicherung einer BefOrderung,
durch die Kulturgut aus dem von der auslandischen Rechtsordnung beherrschten
Gebiet dem seiner Sicherung dienenden Ausfuhrverbot zuwider ausgefiihrt werden
soil. Einem solchen Vertrag liegt ein versicherbares Interesse nicht zugrunde
.... Die in friiherer Zeit iibliche und geduldete Mi{3achtung des Wunsches anderer
Volker, im Besitz ihrer Kunstschatze zu bleiben oder sie selbst zu verwerten, die
das Berufungsgericht erwahnt, kann nicht zum Ma{3stab des nach heutiger Auf
fassung mit den guten Sitten Vertraglichen gemacht werden.
Id. at 86-87.
65. [1975] 1 Can. Stat. ch. 50.
66. Id. at § 31(2).
67. Id. at § 31(1).
68. Id.
69. William, The Protection of the Canadian Cultural Heritage: The Cultural Property
Export and Import Act, 16 CAN. Y.B. INT'L L. 292, 302 (1976).
70. National Cultural Property (Preservation) Act, Papua New Guinea Stat. (No. 26
of 1965).
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which is a prohibited export from the Territory by virtue of the
last preceding subsection is a prohibited import into that place, the
Minister may, by notice in the Gazette declare that the provisions
of this section apply in relation to that place." 71
In Papua New Guinea, the Comptroller of Customs must be
satisfied that: the "collection, article or thing" comes from a place
as designated above; its export from that place "was prohibited
under the law in force in that place for reasons essentially similar
to the reasons for the prohibition of export contained in this Act;"
and that the export was in contravention of the law. 72 If the Comptroller of Customs is so satisfied, the "collection, article or thing"
is a prohibited import within the meaning of the customs legislation.
In practice, there would not seem to be any significant difference in the coverage of the Papua New Guinean, and the Canadian legislation. The latter defines "foreign cultural property" as
meaning, in relation to a reciprocating State, "any object that is
specifically designated by that State as being of importance for
archaeology, prehistory, history, literature, art or science." 73 There
would not seem to be any great difference between this and "collection, article or thing" whose export is forbidden for "reasons
essentially similar to the reasons for the prohibition of export contained in this [the National Cultural Property (Preservation)] Act." 74
"National cultural property" for the purposes of that Act means
"any property, movable or immovable, of particular importance to
the cultural heritage of the Territory, and in particular (but without
limiting the generality of the foregoing) includes ... any object,
natural or artificial, used for, or made or adapted for use for, any
purpose connected with the traditional cultural life of any of the
peoples of the Territory, past or present ...." 75
While the coverage of the two pieces of legislation is similar,
the procedures by which they operate are considerably different.
The Canadian legislation is activated by a request from the government of the reciprocating State to the Secretary of State of Canada.
The Attorney-General of Canada then "may institute an action in
the Federal Court of Canada or in a superior court of a province
71. Id. at § 21(1).
72. Id. at § 21(2)(b).
73. [1975] 1 Can. Stat. ch. 50, § 31(1).
74. National Cultural Property (Preservation) Act,§ #21(2)(b), Papua New Guinea Stat.
(No. 26 of 1965).
75. Id. at § 4(a).

Published by SURFACE, 1983

17

Syracuse Journal of International Law and Commerce, Vol. 10, No. 2 [1983], Art. 6

1983)

National Import and Export Controls

369

for the recovery of the property by the reciprocating State." 76 If
the Court is satisfied that the foreign cultural property was illegally
imported into Canada, it may make an order ensuring return of that
property. 77 Such return may be conditional on payment of compensation by the reciprocating State to a bona fide purchaser for value,
or any other person who has acquired valid title to the property
without knowledge of its illegal export. 78
The sanction under the legislation of Papua New Guinea is
much more direct, but not as extensive in point of time. As mentioned above, the position is governed by the customs legislation
on prohibited imports, and thus only applies for the period of time
during which the customs can so control the material. During this
time, however, the Minister may direct that the "collection, article or thing" may be seized without compensation and "forewarded to the appropriate authorities in the place from which it was
exported." 79
IV.

CONCLUSION

Three major suggestions emerge from the above analysis. First,
draftsmen must pay much greater attention to the export provisions of national cultural heritage legislation. In many cases, these
have been drafted with lack of precision. Probably both draftsmen
and experts in the area of cultural heritage have been uncertain
as to what they wanted to achieve apart from a general prohibition of export. The relationship between ownership, export and
recovery must be examined in depth.
Second, the possibility of an international convention to
regulate the issues of private international law raised in this paper
could be explored. Agreement on these issues would expedite and
make more predictable legal action to obtain return of material,
thus, assisting jurisdictions to overcome the problems mentioned
in this paper as inhibiting such actions. The possibility of an international convention concerning both these matters, and the rules
on the bona fide purchaser mentioned in Dr. Prott's paper following, could be investigated.
76. [1975] 1 Can. Stat. ch. 50, § 31(3).
77. Id. at § 31(5).
78. Id. at § 31(6).
79. National Cultural Property (Preservation) Act, § 21(3), Papua New Guinea Stat.
(No. 26 of 1965).
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Third, the possibility of reciprocal agreements, whether formal or informal, for return of illegally exported material should be
examined by states for which this is a problem. The scope and
method of operation of such agreements and the legislation
necessary to implement them must be studied. States or jurisdictions seeking such agreements must always remember that these
agreements will seldom be willingly reached in isolation; more can
be achieved if the negotiations are tied to some objective of the
other state.

Published by SURFACE, 1983

19

